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Supermarkets,  specialized  wholesalers,  and  processors  and  agro-exporters’  agricultural 
value  chains  have  begun  to  transform  the  marketing  channels  into  which  smallholder 
farmers  sell  produce  in  low-income  economies.  We  develop  a  conceptual  framework 
through which to study contracting between smallholders and a commodity-processing 
firm. We then conduct an empirical meta-analysis of agricultural value chains in five 
countries  across  three  continents  (Ghana,  India,  Madagascar,  Mozambique,  and 
Nicaragua).  We  document  patterns  of  participation,  the  welfare  gains  associated  with 
participation,  reasons  for  non-participation,  the  significant  extent  of  contract  non-
compliance, and the considerable dynamism of these value chains, as farmers and firms 
enter and exit frequently. 
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The modernization of agricultural value chains – the systems by which food flows from the 
farm  gate  to  the  consumer  –  is  both  a  consequence  and  cause  of  economic  development. 
Commercial demand increases due to income and population growth, urbanization, and trade 
liberalization.  Marketed  supply  simultaneously  rises  due  to  productivity  improvements  in 
production, post-harvest processing, and distribution systems. The two processes reinforce each 
other, as the extensive literature on the “agricultural transformation” explains (e.g., Johnston and 
Mellor  1961,  Timmer  1988).  The  combination  of  increased  commercial  demand  and  supply 
induces  the  emergence  of  modern  marketing  channels  employing  sophisticated  management 
methods, such as costly grades and standards or vertical coordination or integration of activities 
that  profitably  add  value  to  raw  commodities  through  transport,  storage  and/or  processing. 
Participant farmers – whose comparative advantage allows them to tap the latent demand of 
better-off or more distant markets made accessible by emergent agricultural value chains (AVCs) 
– typically improve their productivity and profitability, thereby further stimulating commercial 
demand and supply through reinforcing feedback The emergence and modernization of AVCs 
thus result from and contribute to economic development.
1 
 
To what extent do smallholder farmers participate in this process?
2 This paper addresses that 
question through two contributions. It first develops a simple conceptual framework to illustrate 
the process of contracting between smallholders and a modern agribusiness firm engaged in post-
harvest processing, storage, or distribution. Our framework emphasizes several key features that 
emerge  consistently  in  empirical  studies  of  smallholder  participation  in  AVCs,  such  as  the 
prominence of geographic supply chain placement and farmer selection effects, the heterogeneity 
of  contractual  arrangements  and  contract  terms,  the  prospective  roles  of  farmer  groups  and 
cooperatives as contracting agents, and the highly variable (albeit typically positive) average 
returns to farmers from value chain participation.  
 
                                                            
1 See Reardon and Timmer (2007), Swinnen (2007), and Reardon et al. (2009) for recent overviews of the literature 
on AVCs in developing countries. 
2 The term smallholder has no universally accepted definition. Here we loosely use the term to refer to farmers who 
operate a modest amount – typically less than two hectares – of cultivable land, relying heavily on family labor, and 
who have limited access to other productive resources. 2 
 
This paper then offers an empirical meta-analysis of smallholder participation in AVCs in 
five countries across three continents: India in Asia; Ghana, Madagascar, and Mozambique in 
Africa; and Nicaragua in Central America. The objective is to document patterns of participation, 
the gains associated  with participation, and the  reasons for non-participation. A comparative 
approach enables us to tease out general patterns that transcend the specific contextual details of 
any particular country setting, commodity or contracting firm. 
 
The question of smallholder participation in AVCs is of great importance to policymakers 
seeking to stimulate rural economic growth and poverty reduction. From the mid-1980s through 
the  turn  of  the  millennium,  the  prevailing  development  policy  orthodoxy  emphasized 
macroeconomic (e.g., exchange rate, trade, taxation) and sectoral (e.g., agricultural, industrial, 
services)  policies  following  the  so-called  Washington  Consensus.  But  this  strategy  often 
bypassed smallholder households because (i) market segmentation impeded price transmission, 
which in turn distorted incentives and prevented the successful uptake of arbitrage opportunities 
(Barrett 2008); (ii) macroeconomic and sectoral approaches ignored the many market failures 
constraining smallholder supply response (Barrett and Carter 1999); and (iii) the Washington 
Consensus largely ignored the institutional preconditions for markets to facilitate exchange and 
welfare improvements (North 1990; Greif 1993; Platteau 1994a, 1994b, and 2000; Fafchamps 
2004). 
 
Since  the  turn  of  the  millennium,  attention  has  shifted  toward  more  micro-level  and 
institutional policies. In particular, contractual arrangements with downstream processors, agro-
exporters  and  retailers,  often  orchestrated  through  farmer  groups,  are  increasingly  seen  as  a 
means of overcoming the market imperfections that led to the failure of macroeconomic and 
sectoral adjustment policies (Grosh 1994; Gow 2000). Yet smallholder access to evolving AVCs 
– especially to more remunerative markets – is commonly limited. Smallholders’ productivity 
may be limited by geographic or biophysical constraints such as insufficient water for irrigation 
or  they  may  lack  access  to  limited  productive  assets  (e.g.,  land,  livestock,  labor,  tools), 
constraining  their  capacity  to  generate  a  marketable  surplus.  The  production  technologies 
available  to  and  appropriate  for  smallholders  can  be  similarly  limiting.  Finally,  institutional 
constraints - such as limited access to credit and insurance, insecure land rights, and uncertainty 3 
 
regarding new risks – may further reduce the feasibility and attractiveness of AVC participation 
for smallholders. 
 
The handful of empirical studies on the welfare effects of modern AVC participation have 
faced methodological difficulties in establishing the causal impacts of AVCs (i.e., in determining 
whether observed increases in welfare can really be ascribed to participation in AVCs), so the 
degree  to  which  participating  smallholders  benefit  remains  somewhat  uncertain.  This  is 
especially true in cases where new institutional arrangements leave smallholders exposed to risks 
of which they were not fully aware ex ante, and in cases where buyers are monopsonistic or 
oligopsonistic and thus enjoy contractual bargaining power over farmers that may permit firms to 
extract most of the gains from trade (Sivramkrishna and Jyotishi 2008; White 1997). 
 
Consistent with the uncertain welfare results, in places where smallholder participation has 
actually taken place on a large scale, it has been subject to significant reversals. Agricultural 
value chains routinely shed participants or collapse completely. These patterns of engagement 
with and disengagement from marketing arrangements closely resemble patterns of smallholder 




The  remainder  of  the  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  In  section  2,  we  lay  out  a  conceptual 
framework with which to study evolving AVCs. Section 3 briefly describes the data from five 
countries used in our analysis. In section 4, we discuss comparative empirical evidence from five 
study countries and studies specific to these countries. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
In this section we lay out a brief conceptual framework in which an agricultural commodity-
processing or distributing firm contracts with smallholders for commodities that it sells either 
                                                            
3 Indeed, there are strong unexploited parallels between the technology adoption and market participation literatures, 
each of which strives to explain the limited uptake of seemingly profitable “technologies”. In the case of market 
participation, the seemingly profitable technology is a new marketing channel or a contract with a buyer. See Barrett 
(2008) for more on the parallels.  4 
 
wholesale or retail on urban or foreign markets.
4 Our stylization abstracts from many observed 
variations and circumstances, such as the case in which independent local assemblers buy from 
farmers and sell to urban or foreign wholesalers, or foreign importers contract directly with local 
farmer groups. Such permutations can be readily accommodated within our framework, but we 
omit  them  in  order  to  focus  on  the  key  relationships  and  factors  determining  smallholder 
participation in evolving AVCs, as well as the terms and benefits of such participation. 
 
We assume the firm is a price taker - that is, it takes commodity prices as given as they are 
determined on competitive urban or international markets - although we will later briefly relax 
this assumption. The firm sources the commodity from the lowest cost supplier(s), subject to 
meeting  the  firm’s  quality  and  quantity  requirements.
5  In  doing  so,  the  firm  also  takes  into 
consideration  the  costs  -  fixed  and  variable  -  of  commodity  procurement,  the  uncertainty 
surrounding whether farmers will actually deliver, and the dynamic (i.e., learning and reputation) 
effects of current contracting choices on future procurement options.  
 
The firm has the option to procure commodities from the international market, where quality 
is  assumed  to  meet  local  standards  and  expected  prices  are  also  taken  as  given,  and  where 
contracting partners often face stronger incentives to maintain their reputation as trustworthy 
contracting partners with respect to local markets, which minimizes the likelihood that the firm 
will face holdup problems (Williamson, 1985). This import procurement option sets a benchmark 
profit  level  for  the  firm.  A  profit-maximizing  firm  considers  whether  there  exist  domestic 
procurement options preferable to the import procurement option. As we explain below, this 
involves assessing candidate supply regions, identifying specific farmers or farmer groups within 
chosen regions to whom particular contract terms might be offered, and evaluating whether a 
farmer  is  likely  to  both  accept  and  honor  the  offered  contract.  These  decisions  play  out 
simultaneously across multiple locations and with multiple farmers in each given location, as 
well as over time, since both the firm and smallholders learn from past behaviors. 
 
                                                            
4 See Narayanan (2010b) for a more formal and specific development of several aspects of this framework.  
5 See Laffont and Tirole (1993) and Bajari and Tadelis (2001) for classic theoretical works on procurement. 5 
 
This conceptualization of the firm’s problem lends itself to a simple graphical representation 
of  observed  contracting  patterns  and  the  possible  smallholder  welfare  gains  associated  with 
participation in AVCs. Figure 1 presents the stylized problem. The firm’s (expected) profits are 
measured on the vertical axis, with its reservation expected profit level, ∏ (i.e., the profit level 
associated with import procurement; the lower bar denotes a minimum level), shown on the y-
axis. The expected welfare gains of smallholder i in location j from selling to the firm, wij, is 
shown on the x-axis, with wij representing the smallholder’s reservation expected welfare level 
(i.e., the smallholder’s opportunity cost of participating in the AVC; the lower bar once again 
denotes a minimum level). 
 
The wedge bounded from below by ∏ and by wij and above by the Pareto frontier (i.e., the 
arc that depicts the maximum feasible combinations of firm and smallholder welfare) represents 
the prospective gains from contracting. In equilibrium, contracts are signed only if the wedge has 
an expected nonzero measure, and contracts are honored only if the actual wedge has a nonzero 
measure, i.e., the area of the wedge must be nonzero both at the time of contract agreement and 
delivery. Interestingly, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition, since the likelihood that a 
contract will be signed and that it will be honored both increase as the distances between the 
Pareto frontier and both ∏ and wij increase. To put it simply, the more each party has to gain 
from contracting with the other, the more likely one is to observe a contract between them, and 
the more likely is that contract to be honored. As the number of potential smallholder suppliers 
increases, the firm can more credibly make take-it-or-leave-it offers and, if turned down, find an 
alternative  supplier  at  low  marginal  search  costs.  Above  a  certain  number  of  prospective 
suppliers, the contract terms are such that the firm enjoys maximal expected profits Aij, and the 
smallholder  supplier  is  held  down  to  his  reservation  expected  welfare  level  wij,  as  in  the 
canonical principal-agent model (Bolton and Dewatripont 2005). 
 
This  simple  framework  offers  a  clear  and  concise  way  to  understand  the  procurement 
decision of firms and patterns of smallholder participation in (and welfare gains from) AVCs. It 
also underscores a range of challenges faced by empirical researchers in seeking to estimate the 
determinants and welfare impacts of smallholder participation in AVCs, as we explain below. 
 6 
 
To  conceptualize  the  channel  participation  process,  we  assume  the  firm  approaches  the 
contracting  choice  sequentially.  In  the  first  stage,  the  firm  chooses  where  to  locate  its 
procurement  activities  based  on  geographic  attributes  associated  with  a  high  probability  of 
procuring a sufficient quantity of one or more commodities of a satisfactory quality. This might 
relate to the location of a processing plant for a perishable commodity, to geographic variation in 
growing  conditions  or  transport  infrastructure,  or  other  factors  at  a  scale  beyond  individual 
farmer attributes. Consequently, for some regions j, the firm’s expected profits from contracting 
are less than the expected profit level associated with import sourcing, i.e., Aij < ∏, and so the 
firm will simply not procure from region j. In the second stage, conditional on the firm choosing 
to enter region j, it chooses specific farmers i to whom it offers a contract, and it also chooses the 
terms of the offered contract. In the third stage, the farmer chooses whether or not to accept the 
contract  offered.  In  the  fourth  stage,  once  supply  and  demand  shocks  are  realized  and  the 
commodity is ready to be delivered, the firm and smallholder both choose whether to honor the 
contract terms, i.e., whether the firm will hold up the supplier and whether the producer will side 
sell to an alternative buyer (a phenomenon which Fafchamps (2004) refers to as “leaking”). The 
process begins again in the next production period, with firms and prospective suppliers updating 
their information sets based on realized experiences in the most recent period. In the remainder 
of this section, we explore the details of each of the four contracting stages. 
 
2.1. Stage 1: Firm Choice of a Procurement Location 
In deciding on one or more locations from which to procure agricultural commodities, the firm 
considers several factors. First, the agro-ecological suitability of candidate regions, due to basic 
agroclimatic and hydrological conditions, can limit both the potential production volume and the 
quality of specific agricultural commodities. Second, and no less important, the firm considers a 
location’s associated suite of transaction costs including the transportation costs incurred when 
picking up agricultural commodities, the prevalence of insecurity and crime, the quality of phone 
service, and the institutional conditions that may influence the likelihood of contract compliance 
by smallholders. Some geographic determinants can easily be observed by the researcher and the 
firm (e.g., distance, road quality and water availability), but others are often unobservable (e.g., 
institutional reliability).  
 7 
 
The choice of procurement location encompasses not only the region of sourcing, but also the 
location  of  warehouses  and  processing  facilities  and  the  allocation  of  responsibility  for 
transportation between the farmer and the firm. Much as governments and humanitarian agencies 
routinely  find  geographic  targeting  an  efficient  means  for  making  transfers,  firms  routinely 
engage in geographic targeting of procurement, as a longstanding literature on industrial location 
emphasizes (Smith 1971). 
 
These geographic placement effects obviously heavily influence smallholder participation in 
AVCs.  Holding  the  probability  of  contract  performance  constant,  firms  typically  begin  by 
targeting  the  most  accessible  areas  likely  to  meet  their  procurement  needs,  retaining  these 
regions as supplier basins if contracting experiences there meet or exceed expectations. Firms 
sometimes perceive less accessible areas as higher-return or lower-risk, however. This may  be 
because spatial market segmentation offers significant returns to arbitrage, because suppliers in 
remote markets have fewer side-selling opportunities, or because firms enjoy monopsonistic or 
oligopsonistic power on the local market for value-added agricultural production. Thus, although 
firms often prioritize areas close to roads or major urban areas or processing plants, this is not 
always the case, as some of the empirical evidence in the next section illustrates. 
 
The firm faces a number of regions, each of  which consists of a number of prospective 
suppliers. The geographic differences between two regions are illustrated in figure 2, which plots 
the interregional differences in a firm’s expected gains from contracting. Let φ(Ai1) denote the 
distribution  of  expected  profits  from  locating  procurement  in  region  1  as  a  function  of  the 
maximum  profit  to  be  made  in  that  region.  Likewise,  let  φ(Ai2)  denote  the  distribution  of 
expected profits from locating in region 2 as a function of the maximum profit to be made in that 
region. In the context of figure 2, the firm would choose to locate in region 1, since that is the 
only region which, on average, guarantees the firm’s reservation level of expected profit, ∏.  
 
Alternatively, if the firm’s reservation level of profit ∏ were to lie to the left of the mean 
expected profit in region 2 (i.e., to the left of the peak of φ(Ai2)), the firm could choose to locate 
in either region, depending on the risk preferences of its managers. Indeed, managers who are 
willing to tolerate some risk (embodied in the spread of each distribution in figure 2) in exchange 8 
 
for higher expected profits would locate in region 1, which has higher expected profit but also a 
higher expected profit variance, whereas managers who are not willing to do so might locate in 
region 2, which has lower expected profit but also a lower expected profit variance. 
 
The key feature of our formulation of the firm’s first-stage procurement location choice is 
that  not  all  farmers  have  ready  access  to  modern,  potentially  more  remunerative  AVCs. 
Smallholders  further  from  roads  and  major  urban  areas  and  cities,  with  less  reliable 
communications and transportation infrastructure, in lower-potential agro-ecological zones, in 
regions where crime and insecurity are more prevalent, etc. may be less likely to be offered 
contracts. This has strong potential implications for patterns of spatial inequality, as smallholders 
in areas deemed “better” by firms are also likely to enjoy preferential access to higher-value 
AVCs and marketing opportunities, reinforcing their initial advantages.  In so far as regional 
attributes are often correlated with farmer characteristics – for example, more fertile areas are 
more densely populated and thus have smaller average farm sizes – mistaken association of firm 
contracting patterns with farm-specific characteristics – such as farm size – can follow naturally 
from ignoring geographic placement effects in firm contracting behavior. 
 
Procurement  location  effects,  although  pronounced,  are  commonly  overlooked  in  the 
literature. One reason is that there is no farm-level variation in supplier status in areas where 
firms  choose  not  to  contract,  so  these  areas  are  often  omitted  from  surveys  aimed  at 
understanding AVC participation patterns and impacts. When such regions are included, the use 
of  geographic  fixed  effects  effectively  wipes  out  all  explanatory  power  associated  with  the 
omitted  area’s  characteristics.  Social  scientists  need  to  understand  the  procurement  location 
aspect of firms contracting choices, however, both in order to control for it when estimating the 
welfare effects of participation in AVCs, and in order to identify interventions that might expand 
the number of regions in which a firm contracts with smallholders and thereby enable greater 
smallholder market participation. 
 
2.2. Stage 2: Firm Contract Offer 
Conditional on the firm choosing to enter a region j, the firm chooses contract terms and the 
growers within that region to whom it offers a contract. Conceptually, the decision is reasonably 9 
 
simple: offer contracts only to the N farmers i = 1, …, N for whom Aij - ∏ is greatest, such as 
those who, in figure 2, fall to the right of the vertical line in region 1. At this stage, the difficulty 
for firms lies in identifying which farmers are likely to be the most profitable suppliers, given the 
considerable uncertainty surrounding farmers’ inclination or ability to adhere to the contract.  
 
In order to identify the best contracting partners among smallholders, firms look for readily 
observable indicators. For horticultural products, for example, access to irrigation is typically 
key. Membership in a farmer organization or participation in a non-governmental organization 
(NGO) extension program can be another readily observable signal that helps the firm identify 
the best prospective suppliers. A farmer’s expected scale of supply matters insofar as firms face 
smallholder-specific fixed costs that make bulk purchases more attractive. The presence of such 
smallholder-specific fixed costs clearly favors smallholders with more land suited to growing the 
contracted crop, better technical ability and more experience growing the commodities under 
contract, as well as the neighbors of such farmers and members of farmer groups or cooperatives, 
given that they can more easily tap into a social network that is relevant to their contracting 
activities. This scale effect is reflected in market participation data by a high concentration of 
sales among a small number of growers (Barrett 2008). 
  
These scale effects, however, can also cut the other way, as larger farmers commonly enjoy 
greater access to a variety of sales outlets, thereby both increasing the risk to the firm of farmer 
side-selling  and  providing  the  larger  farmers  with  greater  bargaining  power  in  contract 
negotiations. If the expected welfare gains to smallholder i in location j from selling to the firm, 
wij, are positively correlated with attributes such as farm size, access to irrigation, or technical 
ability,  then  “more  desirable”  suppliers  may  require  more  advantageous  contract  terms  than 
would farmers with smaller landholdings, those without access to irrigation, and those whose 
technical ability is lower. For example, the positive AVC participation—farm size relationship is 
expected  to  be  less  pronounced  than  the  market  participation—farm  size  relationship.  Some 
firms actively seek out smaller farms that they deem more reliable or pliable.  
 
In figure 1, the relationship between farm size and participation in AVCs can be understood 
to turn on whether farm size (or any other supplier characteristics) is more correlated with the 10 
 
maximal expected profit of the firm Aij or with the expected welfare gains of smallholder i in 
location j from selling to the firm wij. If, for example, farm size is more correlated with expected 
firm profits, Aij, the firm’s expected profits are best served by contracting with larger suppliers. If 
instead farm size is more correlated with the smallholder expected welfare gains, wij, the firms 
will tend to seek out smaller suppliers.  
 
The firm’s selection of smallholders can be further complicated by the presence of farmer 
groups.  Farmer  groups  can  aggregate  the  production  of  member  smallholders  and  increase 
product  quality  but  may  also  increase  the  bargaining  power  of  smallholders.  Likewise,  the 
involvement of NGOs may provide both the firm and smallholders with complementary services, 
including  agricultural  extension,  initial  provision  of  the  capital  required  to  finance  inputs  or 
investments, or de facto contract monitoring  and enforcement. Moreover, when firms opt to 
contract with a farmer group or with an NGO, the smallholder-specific selection mechanism is 
distorted by the selection criteria of the farmer group or NGO itself. More generally, the fact that 
the  firm  strategically  chooses  the  farmers  to  whom  it  offers  contracts  and  that  farmers 
strategically  decide  whether  to  participate  –  in  other  words,  that  contracts  are  not  randomly 
assigned across smallholders in a given region – creates a selection problem for researchers who 
seek to estimate the welfare effects of or farmers’ behavioral response to participation in modern 
AVCs.  
 
 Further  complicating  such  estimation  is  the  problem  of  unobservable  farmer  and  region 
characteristics influencing participation. If selection occurs merely over observable attributes of 
farmers  and  these  are  all  observed,  dealing  with  the  selection  problem  is  relatively 
straightforward,  following  Heckman’s  method  or  equally  well-established  propensity  score 
matching  techniques.  The  fact  that  a  good  deal  of  selection  almost  surely  occurs  on 
unobservables,  however,  such  as  smallholder  technical  ability,  entrepreneurship,  risk 
preferences, trustworthiness, etc. significantly complicates the empirics of accurate estimation of 
the welfare and behavioral effects of participation in AVCs. Furthermore, knowing that the firm 
seeks particular attributes among its suppliers, some smallholders may choose to make strategic 
investments (e.g., adopt irrigation or join a farmer group) so as to attract contract offers. When 
pre-existing  investments  seem  insufficient  to  attract  contract  offers  for  poorer  smallholders, 11 
 
outside agencies may also step in to facilitate contracting through group creation, agricultural 
extension, provision of certification services, investment in roads or irrigation, etc. Any such 
anticipatory  behavior,  however,  whether  by  farmers  or  by  NGOs  or  farmer  groups,  further 
complicates estimation of the causal link between farmer attributes and market participation or 
the welfare gains from participation by endogenizing key farmer attributes that naturally serve as 
explanatory variables. 
 
The content and the form of contracts can vary markedly across locations and commodities. 
Contracts may take the form of an informal, oral agreement or of a formal, written agreement. 
Formal contracts typically entails higher initial transactions costs, but they often provide superior 
enforcement options (Platteau 2000). No contract can cover all the myriad contingencies that 
arise in agricultural production and distribution, however, and inevitable incompleteness limits 
the range of enforceability.  Further, the costs of formal contract enforcement are often too high 
relative to the prospective recovered damages – and the likelihood of successful prosecution of 
breach of contract too low – to justify pursuing enforcement (Narayanan 2010b). 
 
Lengthy  written  contracts  typically  specify  pricing,  delivery  timing  and  volumes,  quality 
standards and conflict resolution mechanisms. From the firm’s perspective, however, the relative 
informality of an oral agreement could be preferable for several reasons. First, the firm may want 
to retain flexibility to renege on contracts, especially if there is uncertainty about final retail 
demand volumes or supplier yields. Second, the firm tends to favor informal contracts when it 
has strong pre-existing relationships with its suppliers, when nonrenewal of the contract provides 
adequate contract enforcement, and when it is too costly to resort to the formal legal system to 
enforce contracts (Fafchamps and Minten 2001). For these reasons, Narayanan (2010a) reports 
that 46 percent of the smallholders among five firms in India had oral agreements. 
 
A firm can tailor contract terms, and it can choose volume, price, post-harvest processing, 
quality  standards,  production  schedule,  delivery  timing,  etc.,  to  differentiate  the  contracted 
commodity  from  otherwise  identical  commodities  that  the  smallholder  might  sell  elsewhere. 
Such  differentiation  can  potentially  generate  additional  gains  from  exchange,  insofar  as  the 
firm’s final consumers value the attributes specific to the contracted commodities more than the 12 
 
smallholders’ alternative markets do. Some contracts link the purchase of a commodity by the 
firm with firm provision of inputs to smallholders, a guaranteed price to insure smallholders 
against price fluctuations, certification for characteristics which may garner a premium (e.g., the 
FairTrade  label),  or  other  forms  of  value  addition.
6  Such  interlinkages  of  contract  terms 
complicate empirical comparison of the contract price received by a smallholder with alternative 
local spot market prices. For example, stricter grading of contracted commodities or contract 
requirements  for  worker  safety  may  drive  up  a  smallholder’s  production  costs  relative  to 
alternative outlets, thereby making his production of the contracted commodity too expensive to 
be sold on the local market.  
 
2.3. Stage 3: Smallholder Contract Acceptance 
Once presented with a contract, smallholders choose whether to accept the offer or not. Because 
firms cannot perfectly observe the reservation expected welfare level of a prospective supplier i 
in region j, wij, it is possible that (i) a contract offer will be strictly inferior to a smallholder’s 
opportunity cost from entering the contract, which may lead to renegotiation of contract terms or 
an outright rejection of the contract on the part of the smallholder; or (ii) the contract terms will 
yield expected welfare gains to the smallholder well in excess of wij. The firm wants neither of 
these results. 
 
Smallholder i in region j accepts the firm’s contract offer when his subjective perception 
regarding his expected welfare level from participating in the AVC is at least as high as that of 
not  doing  so.
7  A  smallholder’s  participation  in  the  AVC  does  not  imply,  however,  that  he 
perceives the contract as fair. It merely implies that the smallholder’s subjective expectation of 
the  welfare  gains  from  the  contract  exceeds  his  reservation  welfare  level.  Moreover,  in  the 
(likely) event of noncooperative bargaining between the firm and the smallholder, the contract 
offer will in general not lie on the Pareto frontier in figure 1. This reflects the inefficiencies 
                                                            
6 Insisting on standards that drive up the cost of production could actually be a way of preventing farmers from side-
selling if the only outside option is the local market, which offers a significantly lower price for lower quality 
product. If the cost of production exceeds the market price there is no longer any incentive for growers to side-sell. 
7 Note that a higher subjective perception of expected welfare does not necessarily mean that one expects a higher 
level of income. Because smallholders are typically risk averse, for example, a contract that would guarantee a fixed 
(or considerably less volatile) price equal to the expected price on the local market at the time smallholders deliver 
to the firm would be deemed superior to a contract in which the firm purchases the commodity from smallholders at 
a price equal to that on the local market. 13 
 
associated with contracting in the face of uncertainty for both the firm and the smallholder. As 
such, the gains available for sharing depend fundamentally on the efficiency of the contracting 
institutions and the trust between the contracting parties.  
 
The contract can potentially alter the smallholder’s subjective expected level of welfare in 
several  ways.  First,  contracting  may  resolve  market  failures  in:  (i)  insurance  markets,  by 
providing insurance against price risk; (ii) financial markets, by providing access to credit; (iii) 
input markets, by providing access to the inputs necessary to undertake the production of cash 
crops;  and  (iv)  information,  particularly  the  uncertainties  associated  with  the  marketing  and 
production of high-return, nontraditional commodities and the provision of agricultural extension 
services.
8  Interlinked input and output market contracts can  generate efficiency  gains shared 
between firms and farmers, although not all contracts in AVCs involve interlinkage.  
 
Second,  the  firm’s  logistical  capacity  may  generate  economies  of  scale  or  economies  of 
scope which reduce costs, yielding efficiency gains that can be shared among farmers and the 
firm. Note that such gains can arise even in the absence of a contract that interlinks input and 
output markets. The sophisticated, hyper-efficient supply chain management techniques of many 
modern supermarket chains, for example, commonly generate efficiency gains that can be shared 
among contracting parties.  
 
Third,  if  the  contract  reduces  farmer  exposure  to  risk,  it  can  provide  smallholders  with 
incentives to increase their production of a commodity (Baron 1970; Sandmo 1971) or to invest 
in yield-stabilizing technologies such as irrigation or yield-increasing inputs such as fertilizer or 
improved varieties (Liu 2010; Michelson 2010a). Risk reduction may come directly through the 
contract terms or indirectly by linking smallholders to a broader distant market from which the 
smallholders are otherwise economically distinct.  
 
Fourth, firms can certify compliance with standards for which distant consumers are willing 
to pay a premium. Much of the FairTrade movement is organized around this idea, as are the 
                                                            
8 Anecdotal evidence suggests that smallholders often trust private (i.e., firm-provided) extension services more than 
they trust public (i.e., state-provided) extension services (Umali-Deininger 1997). 14 
 
Global  Partnership  for  Good  Agricultural  Practices  (GLOBALG.A.P)  and  the  Rainforest 
Alliance. Research to date suggests that the primary sources of farmer gains from contracting 
arise from the resolution of market failures, economies of scale or economies of scope, and 
reduced  exposure  to  market  risk,  rather  than  FairTrade  or  certification  standards.  Empirical 
evidence on this matter nonetheless remains too thin to form a strong conclusion.  
 
While intuition and empirical observation both suggest that smallholders who participate in 
AVCs  by  contracting  with  a  firm  enjoy  gains  from  participation  on  average,  it  is  certainly 
possible for smallholders to accept contracts that are ex ante welfare reducing. These undesirable 
results can emerge from power relations (Basu 1986, 2007; Genicot 2002) or social pressure 
(Platteau 2000) as well as from misinformation or incorrect beliefs. In the former case, adverse 
contract impacts can persist, while in the latter case, they should be self-correcting after costly 
experimentation with contracting.  
 
There  is  also  the  possibility  that  smallholders  strategically  decline  welfare-enhancing 
contracts, preferring instead to hold out so as to observe the contracting experience of others and 
thereby resolve some of the uncertainty concerning the benefits of the contract. This possibility 
of strategic delay, which is an important feature of the literature on technology adoption (Foster 
and Rosenzweig 1995), implies an externality due to learning effects that could justify subsidized 
interventions  to  stimulate  and  accelerate  smallholder  participation  in  AVCs,  although  the 
empirical evidence on this point remains thin (Michelson 2010b). Moreover, externalities due to 
learning effects may be trumped by the benefits of early entry if a firm’s contract terms are 
especially  generous  as  it  establishes  itself  and  has  to  attract  initial  suppliers  and  has  fewer 
options for holdup than an established buyer might have as the number of willing suppliers 
increases  (Williamson  1985;  see  stage  4  below).  There  may  be  an  important  fallacy  of 
composition  associated  with  scaling  up  the  participation  of  smallholders  in  AVCs;  what  is 
appealing to a single grower in the absence of general equilibrium effects may be less appealing 
once the system has fully responded and shifted the expected returns.  
 
Note  that  the  smallholder  choice  of  contract  acceptance,  like  the  stage  2  firm  choice  of 
farmers to whom to extend contract offers, generates a selection effect that complicates precise 15 
 
estimation of the behavioral or welfare effects of value chain participation. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many of the smallholder selection effects are associated with unobservables such as 
smallholder risk aversion, social networks, entrepreneurship, technical ability, how much the 
grower trusts the firm or its emissaries, etc. As already discussed, selection on unobservables 
substantially  complicates  inference  in  the  absence  of  a  randomized  controlled  trial  in  which 
smallholders are randomly assigned to participation in an AVC, which would be plagued by 
issues of non-compliance and questionable external validity (Barrett and Carter 2010). 
 
2.4. Stage 4: Firm and Smallholder Decisions to Honor the Contract 
Having agreed on a contract, the firm and the smallholder each decide whether to renege on the 
agreement when the time comes for the smallholder to deliver the contracted commodities and 
for the firm to pay. Smallholders have opportunities to breach by diverting some of the firm-
provided inputs to non-contracted crops, by not adhering to the production schedule agreed upon 
with the firm, by side-selling, or by failing to deliver the agreed volume and quality on time. The 
firm may breach by not showing up to collect contracted harvest, by inappropriately rejecting 
product, by lowering the sales price after the supplier has incurred all production costs, or by 
delaying  final  payment.  The  opportunities  for  breach  of  contract  are  many  because  of  the 
multidimensional nature of contract terms and because of the time lags and the relationship-
specific  investments  involved.  Further  opportunities  are  provided  by  the  asymmetry  of 
information  between  the  two  parties,  which  enables  farmers  to  mask  side-selling  as  adverse 
production  shocks,  and  by  market  power,  which  often  allows  the  firm  to  unilaterally  revise 
contract terms on suppliers lacking alternative outlets. 
 
These prospective holdup problems create disincentives for contracting and may lead both 
the firm and smallholders to pass up potentially  lucrative deals out of concern that once an 
agreement is struck, the other party will renege. Indeed, prospective holdup with little recourse 
for contract enforcement is a primary reason for vertical integration in agriculture. Hence the 
importance of selection on unobservables associated with trust, reliability and reputation.  
 
Whenever  one  party  reneges,  the  other  party  must  decide  whether  to  expend  effort  and 
resources trying to enforce the contract. Intermediation by farmer groups or NGOs on behalf of 16 
 
smallholders may generate real benefits in this regard, providing an opportunity for smallholders 
to  challenge  the  firm  legally  or  politically.  What  is  less  clear  is  when  the  firm  will  pursue 
smallholders for breach of contract, and whether it will do so through formal legal channels or 
through informal ones (such as threatening to terminate contracts for a reneging smallholder’s 
neighbors) rather than simply dropping a nonperforming supplier in future periods (Narayanan 
2010a).  
 
Contract performance matters not merely because of the immediate payoff implications but 
also because of its potential dynamic effects on the AVC. Both the firm and smallholders update 
their prior beliefs based on each other’s (and third parties’) contract performance before re-
evaluating the contract offer and acceptance decisions of stages 1 to 3 in future periods. The firm 
may  drop  farmers  whose  performance  did  not  meet  expectations.  The  firm  may  also  drop 
smallholders who fully honored their contracts if, for example, it learns that other regions or 
other smallholders within the same region offer a more profitable or reliable source. Conversely, 
smallholders may exit the AVC if they find that the contract delivers less than anticipated, if new 
outside opportunities emerge, or if their circumstances change. Because of changing firm and 
smallholder attributes and learning from imperfect contract performance by both parties, change 




This section briefly describes the context and data for each of the five studies of smallholder 
contracting  that  we  discuss  in  the  comparative  analysis  below.  Readers  interested  in  greater 
detail should consult the source materials cited. 
 
3.1. Ghana  
The Ghanaian data come from a year-long panel survey of four villages in the Akuapem South 
district, one of the country’s major pineapple growing centers. The survey was conducted in 
collaboration with the Institute for Statistical, Social and Economic Research, and funded by the 
United States Agency for International Development Assets and Market Access Collaborative 
Research Support Program (USAID AMA CRSP). Two hundred and eighty households were 17 
 
interviewed once every two months in 2009. Survey topics included land tenure, farming activity 
including market sales,  shocks, risk attitudes, education, social networks and membership in 
farmer  cooperatives.  Most  households  surveyed  in  2009  were  originally  visited  in  1997-98 
(Conley and Udry 2010) and again in 2004 (Vanderpuye-Orgle and Barrett 2009). In December 
2009, four focus groups were held in one of the villages with former and current pineapple 
growers and two growers’ cooperatives; further interviews with agribusinesses, cooperatives and 
producers were undertaken in July 2010 (Walker 2009, Harou and Walker 2010).  
 
  In Akuapem South district, pineapples are a high-value, nontraditional crop grown primarily 
for export as whole fruits. As described in Conley and Udry (2010), the opening of European 
pineapple markets to Akuapem farmers in the mid-1990s had a transformative effect on local 
agriculture. But, as Fold and Gough (2008) describe, unanticipated changes in the European 
market  around  2004  caused  major  disruptions  for  Ghanaian  pineapple  growers  and 
fundamentally altered the terms of their contracts. Verbal agreements were not honored, and in 
some cases firms which had begun the process of harvesting pineapples from smallholder farms 
neglected to return to pick up the fruit, leaving the farmers with unsellable produce and without 
payment. Both farmers and exporting firms lost their businesses as a result of the demand shock, 
leading  to  a  period  of  intense  rationalization  in  the  industry.  Farmers  interviewed  in  2009 
expressed regret for accepting verbal contracts with the buying firms, and reported that they 
would no longer sell without a written and legally binding agreement (Harou and Walker 2010). 
 
3.2. India 
The  Indian  data  come  from  a  survey  of  825  farmers  covering  five  commodity  sectors  (i.e., 
cotton, gherkins, marigold, papaya, and broiler chickens). The study area – nine administrative 
districts in the southern state of Tamil Nadu – is heterogeneous in its agro-ecological conditions, 
physical features, and levels of socio-economic development. Moreover, the study area includes 
districts that are among the richest as well as the poorest quintiles in India. 
 
The survey, which was funded by the American Institute of Indian Studies, the International 
Food  Policy  Research  Institute,  and  a  Norman  E.  Borlaug  Leadership  Enhancement  in 
Agriculture  Program  fellowship,  was  conducted  in  two  phases  between  2007  and  2010 18 
 
(Narayanan 2010b). The list of contracting farmers for the year of the survey was obtained from 
one contracting firm in each of the commodities studied. Based on this list, all the villages in the 
sample area were divided into contracting villages or non-contracting villages. A similar exercise 
was carried out for the larger administrative units, blocks and districts. Starting from the largest 
administrative unit for the study area, contracting districts were sampled, within which contract 
and non-contract blocks were randomly sampled and then further on, within sampled blocks, 
contract and non-contract villages were sampled. In the villages sampled, a census house listing 
identified four key types of farmers: those currently contracting; those who grew the contract 
crop but for the open market or for other firms; those who had given up contracting; and those 
who had never contracted. The sample respondents were randomly selected from each type. 
 
Gherkins are a nontraditional export crop with no domestic markets. The crop is procured 
from farmers and processed at small-scale plants by washing, rinsing, and preserving in brine, 
acetic acid, or vinegar. Gherkins are then either bottled and labeled for international clients or 
shipped in barrels for bottling. Cotton is a traditional cash crop in parts of the study area, with 
established  local  markets  and  networks.  Recent  years  have  seen  mills  integrating  along  the 
garment chain and extending backward to contract with farmers for good quality, long staple 
cotton for milling. Papaya was introduced in the region in the 1990s for extracting papain, an 
enzyme whose industrial uses range from making meat tenderizer to treating insect bites and 
other wounds. The variety is not ideal for table consumption, and the fruit is used to make 
candied fruit or puree. Marigold contracting was initiated by firms for oleoresin extraction for 
export, mainly as coloring agent for poultry feed. Marigold, however, has a thriving local market 
as a flower used for a number of ceremonial occasions, religious and otherwise. The broiler 
chicken industry is almost completely vertically integrated in the study region, a process that 
began in the mid-1990s. In this case, day-old chicks are provided by the firm and bought back. 
The firm acts as an aggregator but also has its own brand of chicken in various processed forms. 
 
3.3. Madagascar 
The Malagasy data come from a study conducted in the second half of 2008 (Bellemare 2010a). 
Data collection was funded by the World Bank through the Economic Development Board of 
Madagascar (EDBM).  19 
 
 
The data cover six regions; three were identified as high-priority “growth poles” by EDBM 
(Anosy,  Diana,  and  Vakinankaratra)  while  the  remaining  three  were  selected  for  their  high 
prevalence of contract farming (Alaotra-Mangoro, Analamanga, and Itasy). In each region, 100 
households were selected from the two communes with the highest density of contract farming, 
as per the 2007 census of communes conducted by the World Bank (Moser 2008). Half of the 
households in each region participated in contract farming, while the other half did not. The 
survey  team  collected  household-,  plot-,  and  crop-level  data  for  all  1200  households  and 
collected additional contract-level data for the 600 households who were participants in contract 
farming. Given the survey design adopted in Madagascar, the data also include sampling weights 
so as to make the data as close as possible to a random sample. The sample households grew 
several different crops under contract, ranging from basic grains such as rice, maize and barley to 
vegetables such as leeks, onions and tomatoes, to tubers such as cassava and potatoes, and for 
both domestic and foreign markets.  
 
3.4. Mozambique 
The Mozambican data come from the official agricultural household survey (TIA) produced by 
the  Mozambican  Ministry  of  Agriculture  with  the  assistance  of  Michigan  State  University 
(Bachke,  2010).  The  data  were  collected  between  July  and  September  2002  and  between 
September and December 2005, creating the only panel derived from TIA data.  
 
The  sample  is  based  on  the  Agricultural  and  Livestock  Census  from  2000,  using  the 
standards of the National Statistics Institute. In 2002, 4908 households were interviewed in 80 of 
the country’s 128 districts, while in 2005 it covered 6149 households in 94 different districts, i.e. 
14 new districts. The balanced panel consists of 3480 households. The sampling design aimed at 
evaluating rural production and incomes and a stratified, clustered sample design representative 
of rural small- and medium-holders at the provincial and national level was used (Bachke, 2010). 
 
The survey collected detailed information on household characteristics, welfare indicators, 
landholdings,  employment  types  and  remittances  as  well  as  detailed  information  regarding 
farming  practices,  crops  grown,  harvested  and  sold,  and  livestock  assets  and  incomes.  In 20 
 
addition,  there  is  a  community  level  survey  for  both  years  on  marketing,  prices  and 
infrastructure. The focus of Bachke (2010), on which this paper draws, is on the impact of farmer 
groups  on  smallholder  marketing  behavior  and  welfare,  although  only  a  limited  share  of 
agricultural marketing in Mozambique during this period was through modern value chains. 
  
3.5. Nicaragua 
The Nicaraguan data were gathered between September 2007 and July 2008 in collaboration 
with  the  Nitlapan  Institute  at  the  Universidad  Centro  Americana  and  funded  by  the  Social 
Science  Research  Council  and  the  USAID  AMA  CRSP  (Michelson  et  al.  2010;  Michelson 
2010a,  and  2010b).  Two  primary  supermarket  chains  operate  in  Nicaragua:  the  ten-store 
domestic  chain  La  Colonia,  and  Walmart  International,  with  46  Nicaraguan  outlets  in  2009. 
Michelson et al. (2010) describe the sector, the evolution of respective procurement structures 
and the growth in retail and sourcing in the Nicaraguan supermarket sector since 2000. 
 
Researchers collected household and community-level data for 397 supplier and 452 non-
supplier  households.  The  397  surveyed  supermarket  supplier  farmers  comprise  the  small 
population  of  farmers  who  supplied  horticultural  products  to  the  two  primary  supermarket 
companies over some period between 2001 and 2008. For the comparison sample, 452 non-
supplier households were re-surveyed from an existing nationally representative panel that was 
restricted  to  73  municipalities  in  which  it  was  established  that  supermarkets  had  purchased 
horticulture. The original 1996 panel was the result of collaboration between the Nicaraguan 
Agricultural Ministry, the University of Wisconsin, and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
that followed a nationally representative area-based sampling procedure. 
 
Price  data  in  Michelson  et  al.  (2010)  were  collected  from  a  subset  of  the  Nicaraguan 
supermarket supplier population. Three producer cooperatives with ongoing supply relationships 
with the two major supermarkets provided data on prices received and quantities sold over time. 





4. Empirical Findings 
Given the framework developed in section 2 and the data described in section 3, we can now 
discuss the patterns that emerge from the evidence on the determinants, dynamics and welfare 
effects of smallholder participation in evolving AVCs in the low-income world. We structure the 
discussion in this section to mirror the four stages outlined in section 2. 
 
4.1. Firm Choice of a Procurement Location 
It  should  come  as  little  surprise  that  geographic  factors  associated  with  biophysical  crop 
production  capacity  and  the  physical  and  institutional  infrastructure  of  post-harvest  delivery 
figure  prominently  in  patterns  of  farmer  participation  in  AVCs.  We  emphasize  this  because 
geographic  placement  effects  are  commonly  overlooked  in  the  burgeoning  literature  on 
smallholders and AVCs. 
 
The geographic factors that influence firms’ placement decision necessarily vary by crop and 
agroecology. For example, in India, gherkins need to be processed within hours of harvest, so 
most firms work with suppliers within a 60 to 100-km radius of the plant. Gherkin firms also 
have informal eligibility criteria including farmer access to irrigation because the value of the 
produce depends heavily on predictable growth, which depends on reliable water availability. 
Cotton contracting is possible only in tracts with black soil, making only a small subset of the 
India study area a viable source for procurement by mills. Similarly, marigold requires a cooler 
climate and is sourced only from the hilly parts of the study area. Papaya is grown in tracts that 
are protected from the wind due to production risks associated with tree breakage and fruit loss. 
Firms in southern India often go to more remote areas where market segmentation reduces the 
risk of side-selling, as well as to peri-urban areas where transport and search costs are lowest. 
Because  these  geographic  factors  are  commonly  correlated  with  farmer  attributes  (e.g.,  land 
holdings,  educational  attainment,  ethnicity),  failure  to  control  properly  for  the  geographic 
placement effects of firm contracting can severely bias estimates of firm selection on farmer-
level observables (Narayanan 2010b). 
 
In Nicaragua, Michelson et al. (2010) show that community access to water, NGO operations 
in the municipality, and proximity to supermarket retail outlets are strong predictors both of 22 
 
initial inclusion into the supply chain and of continued participation in the supply chain. In fact, 
community  access  to  water  and  geography  strongly  predict  which  of  the  smallholders  that 
entered the supermarket channel between 2001 and 2007 were still supplying supermarkets in 
2008. Smallholder-level selection on observables seems less important than these community-
level determinants in the Nicaraguan case. 
 
In the export pineapple industry of Ghana, freshness is critical to product quality. As a result, 
the major pineapple cultivation areas are located close to the international airport in Accra and 
the major container ship seaport in Tema and  the quality of road infrastructure has  a major 
bearing on the viability of pineapple farming. Farmers in the most remote village (both in terms 
of distance and travel time to port) reported the most difficulties finding buyers for their crops 
and the greatest losses resulting from damage of crops on the rough roads between the farms and 
port. The transport cost is often passed on to farmers, either directly in the form of lower prices 
or indirectly by diminishing the probability of a buyer coming to take their crop. Farmers also 
risk losses if their crops spoil en route to the market or port, either due to heat or impact damage. 
Ideally, harvested pineapples should be chilled immediately and shipped to port on refrigerated 
trucks. However, most smallholders, and the middlemen who buy their produce, do not have 
access to refrigerated transportation. Thus farmers closer to roads and the port are more likely to 
venture into pineapple farming than those further inland and in less-accessible areas. 
 
The  geography  of  NGO  activity  and  farmer  group  emergence  also  matters,  since  they 
commonly help with farmer technical training, initial provision of inputs to enter higher-value 
sub-sectors, and recruitment of commercial buyers. Bachke (2010) finds that proximity to the 
national  capital  in  Mozambique  significantly  increases  the  probability  of  membership  in  a 
farmers’ organization, which in turn sharply increases modern input use, marketed surplus and 
farmer incomes. Likewise, in Madagascar, members of peasant organizations other than contract 
farming  groups  are  more  likely  to  participate  in  contract  farming,  leading  to  higher  farmer 
incomes, but group membership has no direct impact on income itself (Bellemare 2010a). As in 
Nicaragua, NGOs seem to play a significant role in stimulating and subsidizing the emergence 
and operation of farmer groups in Mozambique, especially in the most remote province. This 
effect appears to exist independently of the superior market access of the areas where the NGOs 23 
 
work (Bachke, 2010). In the Ghana study area, the farmer-based company Farmapine was set up 
with NGO assistance in 1998 to build a refrigerated processing facility in the district capital, 
close to the farms, to wash, package and ship pineapples by continuous cold chain. Farmapine 
was  large  enough  to  export  the  fruits  itself,  bypassing  the  middlemen  and  achieving  some 
stability  for  its  members.  However,  the  company  collapsed  in  2007  and  has  not  since  been 
resurrected (Fold and Gough 2008).  
 
In a wide array of circumstances, NGO-mediated subsidization of smallholder entry is likely 
to  result  in  increased  expected  profits  to  the  firm  as  much  as  in  expected  welfare  gains  to 
participating  suppliers.  To  date,  little  attention  has  been  paid  by  either  researchers  or 
policymakers to the distribution of gains from NGO interventions among growers and buying 
firms. But casual observation across several of the schemes we have studied suggest that when 
NGOs target channel-specific interventions, these often (inadvertently) increase Aij, the firm’s 
profits, while more general improvements to smallholders’ options outside of the AVC, wij, for 
example through provision of irrigation or other productive assets more often tilt the benefits of 
NGO or farmer group assistance in favor of farmers because those interventions can be used not 
only within the AVC but also in other livelihood activities. 
 
An important implication of the geographic placement effects consistently observed in these 
studies is that they tend to reinforce geographic poverty traps and regional inequality. While 
there are exceptions to the rule (for example, NGOs that expressly seek out the poorest farmers 
in more remote areas and effectively equip them to produce high quality surpluses of adequate 
volume), our evidence suggests that firms commonly, but not always, opt not to buy from areas 
where infrastructure and agro-ecology conspire to make agriculture less profitable. Rather, they 
most often buy from areas where roads are better and access to water is easier, and which receive 
more  attention  from  NGOs  and  donors.  Insofar  as  participation  in  AVCs  seems  to  generate 
economically  and  statistically  significant  gains  to  participating  farmers  on  average  (Swinnen 
2007; Reardon et al. 2009; Bellemare 2010a; Michelson et al. 2010; Narayanan 2010b), this 
naturally  fosters  rising  spatial  inequality  and  can  reinforce  geographic  disadvantage  within 
countries. Even when less favored areas are included in AVCs, Bellemare (2010a) finds that the 
welfare gains from participation in higher agronomic potential regions more proximate to major 24 
 
urban  centers  were  significantly  higher  than  in  more  remote  areas  of  Madagascar,  although 
statistically significantly positive in both. 
 
4.2. Firm Contract Offer 
Within selected geographic areas, firms choose the smallholders to whom they offer contracts. In 
survey data one typically observes only whether a farmer does or does not participate in a value 
chain.  The  country-specific  work  underlying  this  comparative  paper  includes  the  only  two 
exceptions  of  which  we  are  aware.  Bellemare  (2010a)  uses  a  field  experiment  to  elicit  the 
willingness of both participants and nonparticipants to pay to participate in AVCs, a proxy for 
the farmer’s likelihood of contract acceptance. Narayanan (2010b) elicits both participants’ and 
nonparticipants’ subjective perceptions of the returns distributions to contracting and the next 
best  alternative.  Generally,  however,  it  is  statistically  impossible  to  distinguish  between  the 
firm’s decision to extend a contract offer (stage 2) and the farmer’s acceptance of the offer (stage 
3).  
 
To the extent that one believes that farmers with more land, livestock, irrigation, education 
and  social  connections  enjoy  superior  options  outside  the  value  chain,  and  therefore  have  a 
higher  reservation  expected  welfare  level  than  do  less  well-endowed  farmers  (using  the 
framework  depicted  in  Figure  1),  the  stage  3  farmer  choice  can  be  expected  to  generate  an 
inverse relation between value chain participation and observables associated with remunerative 
livelihood options outside the AVC, conditional on being offered a contract. This need not be the 
case, however, if contract terms are endogenous to the characteristics of farmers in a given area. 
 
Farmer participation is clearly nonrandom, and the strength of the selection effects can be 
strong. In Madagascar, for example, the average treatment effect of participation in AVCs for 
smallholders (i.e., the difference in welfare levels between participants and nonparticipants due 
to participation in AVCs) triples when smallholder selection is taken into account (Bellemare 
2010a).  
 
Overall, evidence from these case studies suggests that landholdings and several other assets 
commonly reflecting initial welfare status have no consistent, generalizable causal relationship 25 
 
with  supply  chain  participation,  contrary  to  much  of  the  popular  discourse  on  the  topic.  In 
Madagascar  and  Mozambique,  landholdings  have  an  unambiguously  positive  impact  on 
participation  at  the  margin.  In  Ghana,  India,  and  Nicaragua,  however,  farm  size  appears 
unimportant or even, in some crops in India, negatively  associated with farmer participation 
conditional  on  geographic  placement  effects.  The  heterogeneity  of  the  evidence  across 
commodities and countries underscores the earlier point about tradeoffs firms face in selecting 
farmers to whom to offer contracts. Contracting with larger, better-off farmers may reduce firm 
transaction costs but may require offering somewhat better contract terms and may increase the 
risk of supplier noncompliance. Various non-land measures of  ex ante wealth likewise have 
uneven and generally weak association with farmer participation in value chains. For example, 
farmer literacy or educational attainment is positively associated with farmer group and market 
participation in Mozambique and Nicaragua, but not in Madagascar.  
 
A few farmer characteristics do appear consistently associated with value chain participation, 
in particular access to irrigation and membership in farmer group. Both variables, however, are 
at least partly endogenous to participation in AVCs. Michelson (2010a) offers clear evidence that 
supermarket  channel  participation  induces  investment  in  irrigation  by  participating  farmers. 
Moreover, evidence from a randomized experiment conducted by Ashraf et al. (2009) supports 
the existence of a causal link between group membership and value chain participation. This is 
similar to the pineapple industry in Ghana, where firms contract directly with cooperatives and 
larger farmers, and smallholders who do not sell through a cooperative choose between selling to 
a middleman or the local spot market (Harou and Walker 2010). Firms seek out cooperatives 
because  the  formal  contracts  written  by  cooperatives  provide  the  buyer  with  certainty  over 
produce availability. In addition, cooperatives can guarantee a certain minimum quantity, taking 
the responsibility to collect the produce from smallholders and reducing the transaction costs 
associated with firms collecting small quantities from a large number of suppliers.  
 
In  several  of  the  study  sites  discussed  in  this  paper,  individual  reputations  and  social 
connections play a major role in smallholder participation. Among Ghanaian pineapple growers, 
smallholders commonly participate through an outgrower arrangement with a larger neighbor. 
Given the difficulty of measuring relationship characteristics reliably in survey data, the prospect 26 
 
of selection on unobservables looms large, making it challenging to establish the casual effects 
of AVC participation on household-level indicators of welfare. The first-best solution to this 
problem is randomized control trials. However, data and data collection do usually not allow for 
this (Barrett and Carter 2010), making it necessary to resort to instrumental variables, propensity 
score matching and panel data methods, or a combination of these. 
 
4.3. Smallholder Contract Acceptance 
It is difficult to disentangle firm- and smallholder-side selection effects in observational data. 
Direct  observation,  extensive  discussion  with  farmers  in  these  five  countries,  and  regression 
analysis nonetheless reinforce several key points. 
 
Smallholders routinely use AVCs to resolve market failures. Agribusinesses commonly offer 
suppliers reliable quality inputs, often on credit, technical extension advice, some degree of price 
guarantees, or a combination of these, thereby resolving financial, input or insurance market 
failures through interlinked contracts. In Ghana, buyers provide mid-season technical services 
and inputs; in Madagascar, processing firms provide agricultural extension services as part of 
their  monitoring  activities  and  participation  in  AVCs  decreases  (cross-sectional)  smallholder 
household  income  volatility  by  about  15  percent  (Bellemare,  2010b);  in  Mozambique, 
participants use more purchased inputs – seemingly due to lower unit prices – and enjoy greater 
harvests (Bachke, 2010); and in India and Nicaragua, contract pricing provides a de facto (albeit 
incomplete) hedge against price volatility (Michelson et al. 2010, Narayanan 2010b).  
 
Regardless  of  the  specific  mechanism  through  which  AVCs  resolve  market  failures,  the 
individual case studies discussed in this paper consistently find positive average returns to value 
chain participation, so participating farmers appear to accurately perceive and act on attractive 
contract  offers.  Of  course,  this  is  not  surprising  given  basic  revealed  preference  arguments. 
Farmers would presumably, on average, only accept contract offers that they expect to benefit 
them.  Moreover,  firms  do  not  know  smallholders’  reservation  welfare  levels  and  will  thus 
routinely offer contracts that deliver welfare gains in excess of these levels. Moreover, because 
firms face search costs they have an incentive to share in the gains from contracting even if they 
have a reasonably accurate sense of the farmer’s reservation expected welfare level.   27 
 
 
Membership in a cooperative or some other farmer organization seems to matter, in part 
because it lowers transactions costs and helps attract contract offers from firms, but also because 
the  contract  terms  available  through  farmer  organizations  are  commonly  better  than  those 
available to individual  growers  acting on their own. Membership clearly has strong positive 
effects  on  welfare  among  participant  farming  households  in  Mozambique,  through  more 
marketed surplus and higher value of production, mostly driven by better access to production 
inputs (Bachke, 2010). Despite having to pay a cooperative membership fee in Ghana, most 
Ghanaian pineapple farmers join because these groups have greater bargaining power, the ability 
to demand written contracts and the financial might to take legal action in response to breach of 
contract. Cooperatives are also a vehicle for accessing resources and skills training. In Ghana, 27 
percent of cooperative members mentioned the increased likelihood of receiving help from the 
government or from an NGO as their main reason for joining a cooperative. This raises the 
question of whether the groups have sufficient raison d’être to continue functioning if and when 
external support for them is discontinued (Harou and Walker, 2010). 
 
When smallholders perceive that joining an AVC does not resolve (or even aggravates) pre-
existing market failures, or if it introduces new risks, they commonly decline to participate. In 
southern India, for example, farmers with access to AVCs for cotton and gherkins believe that 
contracting raises net profit per acre. Non-contracting farmers, however, associate contracting 
with  higher  variance  in  returns,  relative  to  both  not  contracting  and  to  the  perceptions  of 
contracting  farmers.  In  other  cases,  farmers  decline  contract  offers  that  they  perceive  offer 
favorable monetary returns, commonly due to concerns about other risks, such as to health due to 
exposure to chemical inputs required under the contract, or to land, if the crop is seen as mining 
soil nutrients or the farmers perceives some risk of land foreclosure in the event of involuntary 
breach of contract (Narayanan 2010b). 
 
Initially, smallholders may not fully understand the implications of participation in AVCs. 
Some smallholders appear to follow the past experience of others, entering in response to the 
observed past profits of other farmers, sometimes based on high past prices that disappear as 
many suppliers rush into the AVC. This is certainly true in the case of pineapple in Ghana 28 
 
(Trienekens and Willems 2007; Stephens 2008), and it appears equally true in Nicaragua among 
supermarket  horticulture  suppliers  and  in  southern  India.  Entry  often  appears  to  have  been 
impulsive, focusing on the upside opportunities and insufficiently on the downside risks. This 
partially reflects a fallacy of composition problem, given finite firm demand: smallholders and 
NGOs see profitable outcomes from participation and expect similar profits for themselves. But 
in places where initial investments take some time to bear fruit,
9 by the time new capacity comes 
online, market saturation may undermine the contract terms farmers face or increase the risk of 
contract breach by buyers, many of whom may themselves be late entrants with more precarious 
arrangements with retail clients, struggling to access the storage or transport capacity needed to 
evacuate produce in a timely fashion.  
 
The pineapple experience in Ghana is instructive. Figure 3 shows the history of pineapple 
production in Ghana, where market participation accelerated in response to the profits enjoyed 
by early entrants in the 1990s (Conley and Udry 2010). This was followed by a supply crash in 
2004-5.  Fold  and  Gough  (2008)  attribute  this  to  a  shift  in  European  consumer  preferences, 
favoring a different variety of pineapple over that supplied by Ghana. However, discussions with 
local growers and the trade data presented in figure 3 suggest the crash may have been caused 
more by market saturation. Whether the crash was caused by shifting preferences or by market 
saturation, smallholder growers had relied on informal, oral contracts that were readily breached 
by buyers when the market collapsed. The collapse drove many pineapple growers from the 
value  chain,  especially  the  most  recent  entrants  (Harou  and  Walker,  2010).  Ironically, 
government  and  NGOs  began  promoting  and  subsidizing  cooperatives  in  response  to  the 
apparent profitability of smallholder pineapple cultivation, helping to spark the market saturation 
problem, a patent case of the fallacy of composition just described. Thus, well-meaning external 
efforts  to  help  smallholders  who  had  initially  been  bypassed  by  agro-exporters  may  have 
inadvertently induced catastrophic losses for the same late entrants to the market. This cautionary 
tale risks repetition in many other places given rampant enthusiasm for engaging smallholders in 
AVCs. 
 
                                                            
9 For example, in Ghana, the pineapple production cycle lasts 15 months. In India, papaya takes at least eight months 
to become established and yield first fruit. 29 
 
4.4. Firm and Smallholder Decisions to Honor the Contract 
Given agricultural price and yield volatility, it should come as no surprise that both smallholders 
and firms commonly fail to fulfill the terms of agreed contracts. Even in the absence of outright 
malfeasance, adverse exogenous shocks can render one or both parties unable to complete the 
exchange as agreed. The presence of shocks affecting both contracting parties is precisely what 
gives rise to two-sided moral hazard and adverse selection problems. Neither smallholders nor 
firms  can  tell  whether  a  contract  counterparty  simply  reneged  on  the  contract  ex  post,  was 
rendered  unable  to  fulfill  the  contract  due  to  unforeseen  circumstances,  or  was  never  really 
capable of meeting its contractual obligations. In most of our case studies, smallholders routinely 
claim that they bear the bulk of the downside risks, such as risk of non-payment due to the 
product not meeting  agreed standards or loss of crops during shipping. Firms also  routinely 
complain that farmers side sell and fail to deliver product as agreed, however. Written contracts 
can perhaps mitigate some of these problems by serving as a focal point to enforce compliance or 
by providing an avenue to legal recourse in the event of non-compliance. But as Narayanan 
(2010b) argues, smallholders typically have little capacity to prosecute firm breach of contract 
and firms typically are unwilling to jeopardize the relationships on which successful contracting 
commonly depends and, in any case, stand to recover less from most reneging growers than it 
would cost to prosecute them. As a result, contract noncompliance by both farmers and firms 
runs rampant in AVCs, and that is likely an equilibrium (Platteau 2000, Fafchamps 2004). To 
date, there remains insufficient evidence as to what effect (if any) the use of formal written 
contracts has on either performance or ex post enforcement. 
 
From  our  observations  across  the  case  study  countries,  the  problem  of  holdup  by  firms 
appears to increase in the number of smallholders with whom the firm contracts. As firms face a 
larger pool of prospective suppliers, especially when the contract product is perishable, firms 
appear more likely to speciously reject commodities as not meeting agreed quality standards, or 
simply not show up to purchase contracted commodities. In Ghana, firms and their middlemen 
commonly come to harvest the crop. If they do not show to harvest, collect and pay for the crop, 
the smallholder’s only outside option is sale on the local market at a much lower price, roughly 
half, or outright loss due to spoilage caused by waiting on the contracting firm. Similar problems 
were observed in India and Nicaragua in horticultural products. 30 
 
 
Given uneven contract performance histories, it is not surprising that participation in AVCs 
exhibits considerable turnover. Firms frequently drop smallholders, and smallholders frequently 
opt out of AVCs. In Ghana, 56 percent of surveyed farmers who ever joined the pineapple agro-
export value chain had exited by 2009. Around half of these cited lack of buyers or problems 
with exporters as the main reason for exit (Harou and Walker, 2010).  
 
In  southern  India,  all  the  crop  value  chains  studied  exhibited  considerable  smallholder 
movement in and out of the AVC. Among currently contracting farmers, 73 percent of marigold 
farmers had at least one year when they did not contract after they had entered the value chain. 
The corresponding figure was 63.5 percent for gherkins, and 93 percent for cotton.
10  
 
Michelson (2010a) finds that 38 percent of all Nicaraguan farmers who supplied horticulture 
to supermarkets since 2001 had exited the channel by 2008. The income effects of participation 
in the supply chain were nonetheless retained by those who exit, suggesting that participation in 
the supply chain represents a transition to a new equilibrium for smallholders, seemingly based 
on induced investments in irrigation, productive technologies, and new market relationships that 
allow them to sell year round and meet the transaction and quality requirements of the supply 
chain. Once these investments are made, smallholders no longer need to be insured against price 
risk, nor do they wish to abide by the other constraining prescriptions of the contract. 
 
In Mozambique, the rate of exit from contracting farmers’ organizations was also high (57 
percent  between  2002  and  2005)  despite  the  estimated  positive  effects  on  welfare  for 
smallholders who belong to those organizations. The most likely explanation for exit is that the 
NGO that supported the organizations reduced its support or stopped its operation in the area, 
indicating how dependent these organizations are on ongoing support to create the benefits that 
make farmers stay members (Bachke, 2010). 
 
                                                            
10 In India, however, breaks in contracting do not reflect dropping out completely, since respondents were current 
participants in an AVC. 31 
 
At  the  same  time  as  farmers  routinely  drop  out  of  AVCs,  firm  drop  out  has  been  quite 
significant in India, where maintaining contractual relationships has been a struggle in the face of 
difficult contract enforcement, risky export markets due to receding demand and intense foreign 
competition, and domestic competition from other firms. The cotton contracting firm stopped 
contracting in the season following the survey. The marigold contracting firm studied is one of 
three marigold firms that continue to contract, the other two having stopped contracting when 
they failed to secure export orders. The volumes that gherkins firms procure ebbs and flows, so 
that inter-year variation is high, especially in contracted acreage as adjustment occurs mainly at 
the intensive margin rather than at the extensive margin, by the firm shedding farmers from its 
supplier listing. The number of regions firms procure from expands or shrinks, as does the pool 
of  suppliers,  depending  on  market  conditions.  Thus  placement  and  selection  effects  vary 
intertemporally, further complicating careful inference with respect to the causal determinants of 
AVC participation and its welfare effects. 
 
Overall, the picture we see across these commodities and countries is one of considerable 
contracting risk faced by both parties and a high rate of turnover from one year to the next. To 
date, we know little about the medium- or long-term sustainability of participation in AVCs by 
smallholders, although the topic clearly demands attention; this criticism can be addressed to a 
number of topics in development (McKenzie, 2010). 
 
5. Conclusion 
One of the more important and fascinating agricultural development phenomena of the past few 
decades  has  been  the  rapid  transformation  of  agricultural  value  chains.  The  emergence  in 
developing  countries  of  supermarkets,  fast-food  chains,  and  other  retailers  with  downstream 
market power, along with a more prominent role for global agro-exporters, have increased food 
availability, food diversity, and food quality standards. The relatively high upfront investments 
required to participate in modern markets is a challenge to the participation of smallholders, 
however. While the transformation of agricultural markets has progressed quickly in the middle-32 
 
income  countries  of  Latin  America,  Central  and  Eastern  Europe,  and  East  Asia,  it  has  only 
recently been gaining momentum in the low-income countries of South Asia and Africa.
11 
 
In the same way that much of the early Green Revolution literature (Feder and O’Mara 1981) 
focused  on  limited  small  farmer  uptake  of  improved  seeds,  fertilizer,  irrigation,  and  other 
components of “modern” production systems, a large share of the emerging literature on modern 
value chains has been concerned with smallholder participation in AVCs
12 and with whether 
these same value chains might be leaving many poorer farmers behind.  
 
This is perhaps unsurprising given that, historically, market sales of food have been heavily 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of producers, even in regions and countries in which 
market participation is broad-based. Although most of the evidence comes from staple grains 
markets, a relatively small group (i.e., less than 10 percent) of relatively well-capitalized farmers 
located in more favorable agro-ecological zones account for a significant majority of market 
sales throughout the world (Barrett 2008). This suggests that gains from agrifood value chain 
transformation accruing to net sellers in the form of higher profits will likely concentrate in the 
hands of a relatively modest share of the farm population in the developing world, although there 
is presently scant hard evidence on this important point.  
 
Most empirical studies of the welfare effects of AVC transformation and participation have 
struggled to establish causality, i.e., to ensure that the estimated impacts on welfare can truly be 
ascribed to AVCs rather than to some unobserved factors. Consequently, the estimated impacts 
on welfare of participation in AVCs in those studies are not entirely reliable. To be sure, most 
such  studies  suggest  that  participating  farm  households  enjoy  higher  levels  of  welfare.  Few 
studies, however, have credible controls for the nonrandom pattern of geographic placement of 
firm  contracting  and  of  firm  selection  of  individual  suppliers  into  specific  commodity  value 
chains, raising serious questions as to whether the observed associations between farmer income 
                                                            
11 Reardon et al. (2003, 2009), Reardon and Timmer (2007), and Swinnen (2007) document and interpret this 
transformation. 
12 See for example the 2009 special issues of World Development and Agricultural Economics as well as the edited 
volume by Swinnen (2007). 33 
 
and participation, for example, reflect the welfare effects actually caused by the value chain 
transformation or merely placement and selection effects.  
 
The good news is that some progress is being made in this area as researchers have begun 
exploiting panel data designs, credible instrumental variables for participation in AVCs, and 
randomization of interventions to properly control for exogenous drivers of both welfare changes 
and value chain participation (Ashraf et al. 2009; Bellemare 2010a; Michelson et al. 2010a).  
 
Yet as this paper makes clear, much more remains to be explored. In particular, we know 
little  about  the  effects  of  participation  on  potentially  more  durable  and  transformative  gains 
associated with improved nutritional status and educational attainment by smallholders’ children 
and smallholder households’ accumulation of productive assets. Likewise, more needs to be done 
to determine whether the emergence of modern value chains shifts power within the household, 
for example whether men take over “women’s crops” once they become profitable, or grab their 
wives’ land as it becomes more valuable for cash cropping. 
 
This paper has synthesized the findings from five countries – Ghana, India, Madagascar, 
Mozambique  and  Nicaragua  –  to  inform  a  conceptual  framework  of  the  determinants  and 
dynamics of smallholder participation in AVCs and to begin to tease out patterns that are too 
often elusive in a literature heavily dependent on small-scale, one-off case study evidence. We 
hope  that  this  exercise  helps  spur  further  integrative  modeling  and  meta-analysis  of  the 
distributional implications of accelerating structural transformation in the agricultural marketing 
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Figure 1: Gains From Contracting 
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Figure 3: Pineapple Market Participation in Ghana, 1980-2009 